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International Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: The Morality of Multilateral Measures1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Charles W. Kegley Jr.
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Abstract

The failure of the United Nations and other regional organizations to effectively “keep the peace” is more often than not attributable to a lack of commitment to true collective security on the part of the international community than to flaws in the organizations themselves. Kegley argues that the former dominance of political realism is finally being challenged and offers prescriptions for effective multilateral peacekeeping activities. The greatest obstacle to the creation of a mechanism for multilateral peacekeeping is an absence of a moral consensus in a world where the nature of rapidly changing threats to global peace make it difficult to share a common vision.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 10 , March 1996 , pp. 25 - 45
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1996

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