Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2012
What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a “responsibility to protect” more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies “abused” humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the “responsibility to protect” inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as “norm carriers” has been significantly undermined. Second, while the “responsibility to protect” has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.
1 “UN Chief's Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News World Edition, March 26, 2004; available at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm.
2 Tony Blair, speech given to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, U.K., October 2, 2001. I am grateful to Nick Wheeler for bringing this to my attentionGoogle Scholar.
3 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2002), sec. V; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
4 According to Alex de Waal, the government of Sudan has “consistently franchised its counter-insurgency operations to militia,” in this case the Janjaweed. The government provides the militia with arms, intelligence, and air support and allows them to operate with complete impunity, creating an “ethics-free zone.”deWaal, Alex, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace,” African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005), p. 129Google Scholar.
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9 See Thalif Deen, “New UN Force for Sudan Will Skirt Darfur Crisis,” Inter Press Service, February 9, 2005; available at globalpolicy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/ 2005/0208unskirts.htm. It is widely recognized that after an initial respite, the humanitarian situation has actually deteriorated despite AMISGoogle Scholar.
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11 UNSC Res. 1593 (March 31, 2005Google Scholar). Passed with eleven in favor and four abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States).
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14 A process they describe as “norm cascade.” See Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–918CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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27 Constitutive Act of the African Union; available at http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm.
28 Kofi Annan, speech given to the Nobel Foundation, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2001; available at http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annanlecture.html.
29 Most of the unauthorized interventions were conducted with host nation consent, sometimes coerced. For a definitive list of these operations (up to February 2005), see tables 1 and 2 in Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D., “Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 35–36Google Scholar.
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