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WORRISOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT PHILOSOPHY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2015

Bryan Frances
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Abstract

A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 289 - 303
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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