Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T03:30:27.623Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Williamson on Defining Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2020

Manuel Pérez Otero Open the ORCID record for Manuel Pérez Otero [Opens in a new window]
Manuel Pérez Otero*
Affiliation:
University of Barcelona/LOGOS, Barcelona, Spain
*
*Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits (2000), Williamson (a) claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; (b) defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and (c) presents an alternative (non-traditional-conjunctive) definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract two relevant conclusions: (i) Williamson's theory of states and concepts only supports the negative thesis because this theory would explain too much, since it imposes implausible necessary limitations on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. So, there is no appropriate non-inductive evidence for the negative thesis. (ii) Williamson's own definition of knowledge is at risk.

Keywords

analysismental conceptsfactive statestrue beliefconjunctive conceptsevidence
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 286 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Cassam, Q. (2009). ‘Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?’ In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 12–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A.I. (1976). ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy 73, 771–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Otero M., Pérez (2016). ‘La teoría de Williamson sobre los conceptos y los estados mentales.’ Proceedings of the Eighth Meeting of the SEFA, pp. 148–51. Oviedo: KRK Ediciones.Google Scholar
Pérez Otero, M. (2018). ‘El dominio de lo mental en la filosofía de Williamson.’ Theoria 33, 23–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. (2012). ‘Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology.’ Journal of Philosophy 109, 247–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reed, B. (2005). ‘Accidentally Factive Mental States.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, 134–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (2009). ‘Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits.’ In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 203–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (2015). Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2009 a). ‘Reply to Quassim Cassam.’ In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 285–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2009 b). ‘Reply to Frank Jackson.’ In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 330–2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2009 c). ‘Reply to Ernest Sosa.’ In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 364–9. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar