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What is the Function of Reasoning? On Mercier and Sperber's Argumentative and Justificatory Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2020

Sinan Dogramaci
Sinan Dogramaci*
Affiliation:
The University of Texas at Austin, Texas, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper aims to accessibly present, and then critique, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber's recent proposals for the evolutionary function of human reasoning. I take a critical look at the main source of experimental evidence that they claim as support for their view, namely the confirmation or “myside” bias in reasoning. I object that Mercier and Sperber did not adequately argue for a claim that their case rests on, namely that it is evolutionarily advantageous for you to get other people to believe whatever you antecedently believe. And I give my own argument that this claim is false. I also critically look at their suggestion that reasoning has a justificatory function, functioning as a kind of reputation management tool. I argue this suggestion does not amount to a plausible evolutionary function.

Keywords

evolutionary functionhuman reasoningMercier and Sperbermyside bias
Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Special Issue 3: Epistemic Norms as Social Norms Conference , September 2020 , pp. 316 - 330
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

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References

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