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THREE FORMS OF INTERNALISM AND THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

Andrew Moon
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Abstract

The new evil demon problem is often considered to be a serious obstacle for externalist theories of epistemic justification. In this paper, I aim to show that the new evil demon problem (‘NEDP’) also afflicts the two most prominent forms of internalism: moderate internalism and historical internalism. Since virtually all internalists accept at least one of these two forms, it follows that virtually all internalists face the NEDP. My secondary thesis is that many epistemologists – including both internalists and externalists – face a dilemma. The only form of internalism that is immune to the NEDP, strong internalism, is a very radical and revisionary view – a large number of epistemologists would have to significantly revise their views about justification in order to accept it. Hence, either epistemologists must accept a theory that is susceptible to the NEDP or accept a very radical and revisionary view.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 345 - 360
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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