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Shit Happens

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Pete Mandik
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Abstract

In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , June 2007 , pp. 205 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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