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SELF-REGULATION AND KNOWLEDGE HOW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Benjamin Elzinga
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Abstract

In the 1940s, Gilbert Ryle argued for anti-intellectualism about know how. More recently, new intellectualists have challenged the canonical status of Ryle's arguments, and in the ensuing debate Ryleans appear to be on their back foot. However, contributors on both sides of the debate tend to ignore or misconstrue Ryle's own positive account of know how. In this paper, I develop two aspects of Ryle's positive account that have been overlooked. For Ryle, S knows how to Φ iff (1) S is able to reliably live up to the norms for Φ-ing, and (2) S Φ’s responsibly. In the first half of the paper, I argue that the two conditions rule out the various counter-examples to the simple ability view attributed to Ryle. In the second half of the paper, I argue that Ryle's second condition provides us with an account of warrant related to know how.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 119 - 140
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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