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PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT: IT'S NOT JUST ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2012

Jeremy Fantl  and
Matthew McGrath
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Abstract

There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough to be a reason one has for believing other things.

Type
Symposium on Pragmatic Encroachment
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 27 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

REFERENCES

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