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POLICING EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2013

Justin P. Bruner
Justin P. Bruner*
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

I examine how particular social arrangements and incentive structures encourage the honest reporting of experimental results and minimize fraudulent scientific work. In particular I investigate how epistemic communities can achieve this goal by promoting members to police the community. Using some basic tools from game theory, I explore a simple model in which scientists both conduct research and have the option of investigating the findings of their peers. I find that this system of peer policing can in many cases ensure high levels of honesty.

Type
Discussion
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 403 - 416
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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