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Peerage

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Earl Conee
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Abstract

Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , October 2009 , pp. 313 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

REFERENCES

Conee, Earl. Forthcoming. “Rational Disagreement Defended.” In Feldman, R. and Warfield, T. (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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