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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Roger White
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Abstract

I treat you as a thermometer when I use your belief states as more or less reliable indicators of the facts. Should I treat myself in a parallel way? Should I think of the outputs of my faculties and yours as like the readings of two thermometers the way a third party would? I explore some of the difficulties in answering these questions. If I am to treat myself as well as others as thermometers in this way, it would appear that I cannot reasonably trust my own convictions over yours unless I have antecedent reason to suppose that I am more likely than you to get things right. I appeal to some probabilistic considerations to suggest that our predicament as thermometers might not actually be as bad as it seems.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , October 2009 , pp. 233 - 250
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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