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NORMAN AND TRUETEMP REVISITED RELIABILISTICALLY: A PROPER FUNCTIONALIST DEFEAT ACCOUNT OF CLAIRVOYANCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Harmen Ghijsen
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Abstract

The cases of Norman the Clairvoyant and Mr. Truetemp form classic counterexamples to the process reliabilist's claim that reliability is sufficient for prima facie justification. I discuss several ways in which contemporary reliabilists have tried to deal with these counterexamples, and argue that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I propose that the most promising route lies with an appeal to a specific kind of higher-order defeat that is best cashed out in terms of properly functioning monitoring mechanisms.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 1: The Epistemology of Perception , March 2016 , pp. 89 - 110
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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