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LEARNING TO SIGNAL WITH PROBE AND ADJUST

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2012

Brian Skyrms
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Abstract

This is an investigation of the emergence of signaling using one kind of trial and error learning: probe and adjust.

Type
Signaling and Information Transmission
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Special Issue 2: Formal Social Epistemology, in memory of Horacio Arló-Costa , June 2012 , pp. 139 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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