Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T01:15:44.832Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

IT'S OK TO MAKE MISTAKES: AGAINST THE FIXED POINT THESIS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2017

Claire Field Open the ORCID record for Claire Field [Opens in a new window]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Can we make mistakes about what rationality requires? A natural answer is that we can, since it is a platitude that rational belief does not require truth; it is possible for a belief to be rational and mistaken, and this holds for any subject matter at all. However, the platitude causes trouble when applied to rationality itself. The possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality requires generates a puzzle. When combined with two further plausible claims – the enkratic principle, and the claim that rational requirements apply universally – we get the result that rationality generates inconsistent requirements. One popular and attractive solution to the puzzle denies that it is possible to make rational mistakes about what rationality requires. I show why (contra Titelbaum (2015b), and Littlejohn (2015)) this solution is doomed to fail.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 175 - 185
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Adler, J. E. 2002. ‘Akratic Believing?’ Philosophical Studies, 110: 1–27.Google Scholar
BonJour, L. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1999. ‘Normative Requirements.’ Ratio, 12 (4): 398–419.Google Scholar
Brown, J. Forthcoming. Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Brownstein, M. 2014. ‘Rationalizing Flow: Agency in Skilled Unreflective Action.’ Philosophical Studies, 168 (2): 545–68.Google Scholar
Carroll, L. 1895. ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.’ Mind, 4 (14): 278–80.Google Scholar
Christensen, D. 2004. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief (Vol. 11), pp. 185–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cohen, S. and Comesaña, J. 2013. ‘Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic.’ Inquiry, 56 (1): 15–29.Google Scholar
Field, H. 1998. ‘Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic.’ Philosophical Studies, 92 (1/2): 1–24.Google Scholar
Gibbons, J. 2013. The Norm of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greco, D. 2014. ‘A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.’ Philosophical Studies, 167 (2): 201–19.Google Scholar
Grice, P. 2001. Aspects of Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Harman, G. 1986. Change in View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. and Bovens, L. 1999. ‘The Preface, The Lottery, and the Logic of Belief.’ Mind, 108 (430): 241–64.Google Scholar
Horowitz, S. 2014. ‘Epistemic Akrasia.’ Noûs, 48 (4): 718–44.Google Scholar
Ichikawa, J. J. and Jarvis, B. W. 2013. The Rules of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2016. ‘Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92 (3): 79–100.Google Scholar
Kolodny, N. 2005. ‘Why be Rational?’ Mind, 114 (455): 509–63.Google Scholar
Kvanvig, J. L. 2014. Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2014. ‘Higher-order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88 (2): 314–45.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C. 2015. ‘Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (3): 1–19.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C. Forthcoming. ‘A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.’ In Julien Dutant, F. D. (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Macfarlane, J. Ms. ‘In What Sense (if any) is Logic Normative for Thought?’Google Scholar
Montero, B. G. 2016. Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Owens, D. 2002. ‘Epistemic Akrasia.’ The Monist, 85 (3): 381–97.Google Scholar
Reed, N., McLeod, P. and Dienes, Z. 2010. ‘Implicit Knowledge and Motor Skill: What People Who Know How to Catch Don't Know.’ Consciousness and Cognition, 19 (1): 63–76.Google Scholar
Smithies, D. 2012. ‘Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2): 273–300.Google Scholar
Sutton, J. 2005. ‘Stick to What you Know.’ Noûs, 39 (3): 359–96.Google Scholar
Sutton, J. 2007. Without Justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Titelbaum, M. G. 2015a. ‘How to Derive a Narrow-scope Requirement from Wide-scope Requirements.’ Philosophical Studies, 172 (2): 535–42.Google Scholar
Titelbaum, M. G. 2015b. ‘Rationality's Fixed Point (Or: In Defense of Right Reason).’ In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, pp. 253–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.’ In Dutant, J. and Dohrn, D. (eds), The New Evil Demon Problem, pp. 1689–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2004a. ‘Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws.’ Dialectica: International Journal of Philosophy of Knowledge, 58(1): 155–75.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2004b. ‘On Epistemic Entitlement: Warrant for Nothing?’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78: 167–212.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2014. ‘On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology.’ In Dodd, D. and Zardini, E. (eds), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, pp. 213–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar