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Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Extract

Knowledge is a collective good. Only a small part of our knowledge of the world is generated by our own personal experience. Relying on what others say is one of the most fundamental ways to acquire knowledge, not only about the external world, but also about who we are, for instance about when and where we were born. To use Mary Douglas' words: “Our colonisation of each others' minds is the price we pay for thought”.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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