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THE IRRATIONALITY OF PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2018

Daniel Grosz Open the ORCID record for Daniel Grosz [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in which the pluralistically ignorant agent's belief is irrational, despite the fact that this belief lacks a defeater. Finally, I consider instances of pluralistically ignorant agents whose beliefs are not irrational, but explain why such cases are not problematic for my main thesis. This critical discussion allows me to offer an important amendment to an extant account of pluralistic ignorance.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 195 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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