Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T19:04:58.086Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

IN DEFENCE OF TRANSMISSION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2015

Stephen Wright
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to transmission theories of testimony, a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony can be supported by the speaker's justification for what she says. The most powerful objection to transmission theories is Jennifer Lackey's persistent believer case. I argue that important features about the epistemology of testimony reveal how transmission theories can account for Lackey's case. Specifically, I argue that transmission theorists should hold that transmission happens only if a listener believes a speaker's testimony based on the presumption that the speaker has justification for what she says. If this does not happen in the persistent believer case, then the case is no counterexample to transmission. If this does happen in the persistent believer case, then there is an available framework for rejecting the idea that the listener's belief is in fact justified.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 13 - 28
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Burge, T. 1993. ‘Content Preservation.’ Philosophical Review, 102: 457–88.Google Scholar
Carter, J. A. & Nickel, P. J. 2014. ‘On Testimony and Transmission.’ Episteme, 11: 145–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faulkner, P. 2011. Knowledge on Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fricker, E. 2006. ‘Second-Hand Knowledge.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 592–618.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2005. ‘Testimonial Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony.’ Analysis, 65: 302–11.Google Scholar
Graham, P. 2006. ‘Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?’ Philosophica, 78: 105–27.Google Scholar
Graham, P. 2010. ‘Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.’ In Haddock, A., Millar, A., and Pritchard, D. (eds), Social Epistemology, pp. 148–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hinchman, E. 2005. ‘Telling as Inviting to Trust.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 562–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1982. ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 435–79.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1994. ‘Knowledge by Hearsay.’ In Matilal, B. K. and Chakrabarti, A. (eds), Knowing from Words, pp. 195–224. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1995. ‘Knowledge and the Internal.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 877–93.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 2002. ‘Knowledge and the Internal Revisited.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 97–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMyler, B. 2011. Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moran, R. 2005. ‘Getting Told and Being Believed.’ Philosophers' Imprint, 5: 1–29.Google Scholar
Pelling, C. 2013. ‘Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety.’ Philosophical Studies, 164: 205–17.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2012. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pryor, J. 2000. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.’ Nous, 34: 517–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. 2010. Knowing Full Well. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wright, S. 2014. ‘Sosa on Knowledge from Testimony.’ Analysis, 74: 249–54.Google Scholar
Wright, S. forthcoming. ‘Sincerity and Transmission.’ Ratio.Google Scholar