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HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 September 2017

Alexander Jackson
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Abstract

This paper explains what's wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume's argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.

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Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 157 - 174
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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