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HOW TO CONDORCET A GOLDMAN

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2015

Michele Palmira
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Abstract

In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 413 - 425
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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