Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T02:38:24.518Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

EXPERT-ORIENTED ABILITIES VS. NOVICE-ORIENTED ABILITIES: AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2017

Michel Croce Open the ORCID record for Michel Croce [Opens in a new window]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 476 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Boyd, K. 2017. ‘Testifying Understanding.’ Episteme, 14(1): 103–27.Google Scholar
Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. 2014. ‘Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem.’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 1–13.Google Scholar
Christiano, T. 2012. ‘Authority.’ In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority/.Google Scholar
Coady, D. 2012. What To Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Elgin, C. 2007. ‘Understanding and the Facts.’ Philosophical Studies, 132: 33–42.Google Scholar
Fuller, S. 1988. Social Epistemology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2001. ‘Experts: Which One Should You Trust?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 85–110.Google Scholar
Gordon, E. 2017. ‘Social Epistemology and the Acquisition of Understanding.’ In Grimm, S., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, pp. 293–317. New York, NY: Routledge.Google Scholar
Grimm, S. 2014. ‘Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.’ In Fairweather, A. (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, pp. 329–45. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar
Hardwig, J. 1985. ‘Epistemic Dependence.’ Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335–49.Google Scholar
Hills, A. 2009. ‘Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.’ Ethics, 120: 94–127.Google Scholar
Jäger, C. 2016. ‘Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding.’ Episteme, 13(2): 167–85.Google Scholar
Keren, A. 2014a. ‘Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account.’ Synthese, 191: 2593–615.Google Scholar
Keren, A. 2014b. ‘Zagzebski on Authority and Pre-emption in the Domain of Belief.’ European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6: 61–76.Google Scholar
Kvanvig, J. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kvanvig, J. 2009. ‘The Value of Understanding.’ In Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Epistemic Value, pp. 95–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. Forthcoming. ‘Experts and Peer Disagreement.’ In Benton, M., J., Hawthorne and Rabinowitz, D. (eds), Knowledge, Belief and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2009. ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 64: 19–43.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1979. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 2006. ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception.’ Minnesota Law Review, 90: 1003–1044.Google Scholar
Ryan, S. 2011. ‘Wisdom, Knowledge, and Rationality.’ Acta Analytica, 27: 99–112.Google Scholar
Whitcomb, D. 2010. ‘Wisdom.’ In Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, pp. 95–105. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 2008. On Epistemology. Belmont: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 2012. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 2014. ‘Epistemic Authority and Its Critics.’ European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6: 169–87.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 2016. ‘Replies to Christoph Jäger and Elizabeth Fricker.’ Episteme, 13(2): 187–94.Google Scholar