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EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2019

Coran Stewart
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Abstract

Experts use their superior skills and understanding to mediate between evidence in some domain and non-experts. But how should we understand the proper relationship between experts and non-experts? In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving experts’ mediating role from the perspective of non-experts: the Authority View and the Advisor View. Jennifer Lackey (2018) has criticized the Authority View and defended the Advisor View. I defend an account of epistemic authority that avoids her criticisms while arguing the Advisor View lacks the advantages she claims. Ultimately, I present a hybrid approach according to which whether we should treat experts as authorities or advisors varies depending upon the presence of certain epistemic and moral concerns.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 420 - 437
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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