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EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE IS EVIDENCE UNDER SCREENING-OFF

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2013

William Roche
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Abstract

An important question in the current debate on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is whether evidence of evidence is evidence. Fitelson argues (persuasively in my view) that, at least on some renderings of the thesis that evidence of evidence is evidence, there are cases where evidence of evidence is not evidence. I introduce a ‘screening-off’ condition and show that under this condition evidence of evidence is evidence.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 119 - 124
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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