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EVIDENCE AND INTUITION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

Yuri Cath
Yuri Cath*
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Many philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007: ch. 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: (i) it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; (ii) it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; (iii) it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and (iv) it does not lead to scepticism.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 311 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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