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EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2013

Klemens Kappel
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Abstract

It seems obvious that informational privacy has an epistemological component; privacy or lack of privacy concerns certain kinds of epistemic relations between a cogniser and sensitive pieces of information. One striking feature of the fairly substantial philosophical literature on informational privacy is that the nature of this epistemological component of privacy is only sparsely discussed. The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on the epistemological component of informational privacy.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Special Issue 2: Privacy, Secrecy, and Epistemology , June 2013 , pp. 179 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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