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Epistemic Trust and Social Location

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Nancy Daukas
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Abstract

Epistemic trustworthiness is defined as a complex character state that supervenes on a relation between first- and second-order beliefs, including beliefs about others as epistemic agents. In contexts shaped by unjust power relations, its second-order components create a mutually supporting link between a deficiency in epistemic character and unjust epistemic exclusion on the basis of group membership. In this way, a deficiency in the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness plays into social/epistemic interactions that perpetuate social injustice. Overcoming that deficiency and, along with it, normalized practices of epistemic exclusion, requires developing a self-critical perspective on the partial, socially-located character of one's perspective and the consequent epistemic value of inclusiveness.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 3 , Issue 1-2 , June 2006 , pp. 109 - 124
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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