Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-21T23:47:19.953Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Division of Epistemic Labor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Abstract

In this paper I formulate the thesis of the Division of Epistemic Labor as a thesis of epistemic dependence, illustrate several ways in which individual subjects are epistemically dependent on one or more of the members of their community in the process of knowledge acquisition, and draw conclusions about the cognitively distributed nature of some knowledge acquisition.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Feldman, R. and Conee, E.. 1985. “Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48(1): 1534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, E. 1994. “Against Gullibility.” In Matilal, B. K. and Chakrabarti, A. (eds.), Knowing from Words, pp. 125–61. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fumerton, R. 2007. “The Epistemic Role of Testimony: Internalist and Externalist Perspectives.” In Lackey, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, pp. 7792. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2005. “Testimonial Knowledge from Unsafe Testimony.” Analysis 65(4): 302–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2006. “Testimony as Evidence.” Philosophica 78: 2952.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2008. “Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2009. “The Social Epistemic Virtues: Two Models.” Acta Analytica 24(4): 237–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 2010. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. Forthcoming a. “If That Were True I Would Have Heard About It by Now.” In Goldman, A. and Whitcomb, D. (eds.), Social Epistemology: An Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldberg, S. Forthcoming b. “The Epistemology of Silence.” In Haddock, A., Millar, A., and Pritchard, D. (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Graham, P. 2000. “Transferring Knowledge.” Noûs 34: 131–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J. 2007. “Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge.” Episteme 4(3): 335–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J. 1999. “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49: 471–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J. 2007a. “It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” In Lackey, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, pp. 160–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2007b. “WhyWe Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158: 345–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lipton, P. 2007. “Alien Abduction: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Management of Testimony.” Episteme 4(3): 238–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1994. “Knowledge by Hearsay.” In Matilal, B. K. and Chakrabarti, A. (eds.), Knowing from Words, pp. 195224. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Owens, D. 2000. Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2004. “The Epistemology of Testimony.” Philosophical Issues 14: 326–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmitt, F. 2006. “Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons.” In Lackey, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, pp. 193224. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar