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DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

David Christensen
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Abstract

We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 397 - 422
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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