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A DILEMMA FOR THE KNOWLEDGE DESPITE FALSEHOOD STRATEGY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2017

Christopher Buford  and
Christopher Michael Cloos
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Abstract

One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 166 - 182
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

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