Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T06:21:24.163Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2020

Briana Toole Open the ORCID record for Briana Toole [Opens in a new window]
Briana Toole*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College, CA, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Standpoint epistemology, the view that social identity is relevant to knowledge-acquisition, has been consigned to the margins of mainstream philosophy. In part, this is because the principles of standpoint epistemology are taken to be in opposition to those which guide traditional epistemology. One goal of this paper is to tease out the characterization of traditional epistemology that is at odds with standpoint epistemology. The characterization of traditional epistemology that I put forth is one which endorses the thesis of intellectualism, the view that knowledge does not depend on non-epistemic features. I then suggest that two further components – the atomistic view of knowers and aperspectivalism – can be usefully interpreted as supporting features of intellectualism. A further goal of this paper is to show that we ought to resist this characterization of traditional epistemology. I use pragmatic encroachment as a dialectical tool to motivate the denial of intellectualism, and consequently, the denial of both supporting components. I then attempt to show how it is possible to have a view, similar to pragmatic encroachment, that takes social identity, rather than stakes, to be the feature that makes a difference to what a person is in a position to know.

Keywords

traditional epistemologystandpoint epistemologypragmatic encroachmentstakesintellectualismsocial identityepistemic oppression
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 47 - 65
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alcoff, L.M. (2007). ‘Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types.’ In Sullivan, S. and Tuana, N. (eds), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, pp. 39–58. New York, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, E. (1995). ‘Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense.’ Hypatia 10(3), 50–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Antony, L. (2006). ‘The Socialization of Epistemology.’ In Goodin, R.E. and Tilly, C. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 58–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bloom, P. (2016). Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion. New York, NY: Harper Collins.Google Scholar
BonJour, L. (1980). ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 53–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bonta, M., Gosford, R., Eussen, D., Ferguson, N., Loveless, E. and Witwer, M. (2017). ‘Intentional Fire-Spreading by ‘Firehawk’ Raptors in Northern Australia.’ Journal of Ethnobiology 37(4), 700–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Code, L. (1995). Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Collins, P. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Crasnow, S. (2009). ‘Is Standpoint Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology? An Introduction.’ Hypatia 24(4), 189–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crenshaw, K.W. (1994). ‘The Marginalization of Sexual Violence against Black Women.’ NCASA Journal 2(1), 1–15.Google Scholar
Daston, L. (1992). ‘Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective.’ Social Studies of Science 22(4), 597–618.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeRose, K. (1992). ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4), 913–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeRose, K. (2002). ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.’ Philosophical Review 11(2), 167–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deur, D., Dick, A., Recalma-Clutesi, K. and Turner, N.J. (2015). ‘Kwakwaka'wakw ‘Clam Gardens’.’ Human Ecology 43(2), 201–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feigl, H. (1953). ‘The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism.’ In Feigl, H. and Brodbeck, M. (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science: Naturalism and Humanism, pp. 8–18. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.Google Scholar
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gill, J. (1999). ‘Knowledge, Power, and Freedom: Native American and Western Epistemological Paradigms.’ Philosophy Today 43(4), 423–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, C. (1987). ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development.’ In Kittay, E.F. and Meyers, D.T. (eds), Women and Moral Theory, pp. 19–36. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Goldman, A.I. (1979). ‘What is Justified Belief?’ In Pappas, G. (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, pp. 1–23. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Goldman, A.I. (2010). ‘Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.’ In Feldman, R. and Warfield, T. (eds), Disagreement, pp. 187–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grasswick, H.E. (2004). ‘Individuals-in-Communities: The Search for a Feminist Model of Epistemic Subjects.’ Hypatia 19(3), 85–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haack, S. (1993). ‘Epistemological Reflections of an Old Feminism.’ Reason Papers 18, 31–43.Google Scholar
Haraway, D. (1978). ‘Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Pts. 1 and 2.’ Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Harding, S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.Google Scholar
Harding, S. (2004). ‘A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory's Controversiality.’ Hypatia 19(1), 25–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hartsock, N. (1983). ‘‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism.’ In Harding, S. and Hintikka, M.B. (eds), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, pp. 283–310. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hempel, C.G. (1952). Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hekman, S. (1997). ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited.’ Signs 22(2), 341–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hester, L. and Cheney, J. (2001). ‘Truth and Native American Epistemology.’ Social Epistemology 15(4), 319–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Intemann, K. (2009). ‘Why Diversity Matters: Understanding and Applying the Diversity Component of the National Science Foundation's Broader Impacts Criterion.’ Social Epistemology 23(3–4), 249–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Intemann, K. (2010). ‘25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?’ Hypatia 25, 778–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jaggar, A.M. (1983). Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Janack, M. (1997). ‘Standpoint Epistemology Without the ‘Standpoint'? An Examination of Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Authority.’ Hypatia 12(2), 125–39.Google Scholar
Kelly, T. (2014). ‘Evidence Can Be Permissive.’ In Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pp. 298–311. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kelly, T. (2016). ‘Evidence.’ In Zalta, E.N (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/.Google Scholar
Kukla, R. (2006). ‘Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge.’ Episteme 3(1), 80–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kukla, R. and Ruetsche, L. (2002). ‘Contingent Natures and Virtuous Knowers: Could Epistemology be ‘Gendered'?’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32(3), 389–418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laidler, G. (2006). ‘Inuit and Scientific Perspectives on the Relationship Between Sea Ice and Climate Change: The Ideal Complement?’ Climatic Change 78, 407–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lloyd, E. (1995). ‘Objectivity and the Double Standard for Feminist Epistemologies.’ Synthese 104(3), 351–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Longino, H. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacFarlane, J. (2011). ‘Relativism and Knowledge Attributions.’ In Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, pp. 536–44. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Martin, E. (1991). ‘The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles.’ Signs 16(3), 485–501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Medina, J. (2013). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mills, C.W. (1997). The Racial Contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Mills, C.W. (2007). ‘White Ignorance.’ In Sullivan, S. and Tuana, N. (eds), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, pp. 11–38. New York, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
Neta, R. (2007). ‘In Defense of Epistemic Relativism.’ Episteme 4(1), 30–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nelson, L.H. (1990). Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, L.H. (1993). ‘Epistemological Communities.’ In Alcoff, L. and Potter, E. (eds), Feminist Epistemologies, pp. 121–59. New York, NY: Routledge.Google Scholar
Ninan, D. (2010). ‘De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication.’ Philosophy Compass 5(7), 551–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, L.A. (2016). ‘First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of Empathy.’ Inquiry 60(3), 189–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pohlhaus, G. (2011). ‘Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.’ Hypatia 27(4), 715–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prinz, J. (2011). ‘Against Empathy.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, 214–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, P. (1991). ‘Marx and the Objectivity of Science.’ In Boyd, R., Gasper, P. and Trout, J.D. (eds), The Philosophy of Science, pp. 763–73. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Risjord, M. (2010). Nursing Knowledge: Science, Practice, and Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Rolin, K. (2009). ‘Standpoint Theory as a Methodology for the Study of Power Relations.’ Hypatia 24(4), 218–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rolin, K. (2016). ‘Values, Standpoints, and Scientific/Intellectual Movements.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 56, 11–19.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Scheman, N. (1995). ‘Symposium: Feminist Epistemology.’ Metaphilosophy 26(3), 177–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schoenfield, M. (2013). ‘Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.’ Noûs 48(2), 193–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tatum, B.D. (1997). ‘The Development of White Identity.’ In Tatum, B.D. (ed.), Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?, pp. 93–113. New York, NY: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Thorpe, N. (2001). ‘Climate and Caribou: Inuit Knowledge of the Impacts of Climate Change.’ In Hunting, H. (ed.), Arctic Flora & Fauna: Status and Conservation, p. 101. Helsinki: CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna).Google Scholar
Wilson, R. (2017). The Eugenics Mind Project. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wylie, A. (2003). ‘Why Standpoint Matters.’ In Figueroa, R. and Harding, S.G. (eds), Science and Other Cultures: Diversity in the Philosophy of Science and Technology, pp. 26–48. London: Routledge.Google Scholar