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DEBASING SKEPTICISM REFUTED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2015

Earl Conee
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Abstract

A belief is debased when believing is given a basis that is not proper for knowledge, such as wishful thinking or superstition. The possibility of a debasing demon is the possibility of a maximally powerful agent who aims to prevent knowledge by debasing beliefs. Jonathan Schaffer contends that the debasing demon is a threat to all knowledge. Schaffer does not assess the strength of the skeptical challenge from debasing. It is argued here that debasing does not strengthen any case for skepticism. A debasing demon is possible. We should acknowledge that our beliefs could have been debased, and that this could have been done in an introspectively undetectable way. But acknowledging this leaves us in a position to know that our apparent knowledge is genuine. It does not enhance any reason to think that we lack knowledge.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 1 - 11
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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