Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T03:27:02.112Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

THE DANGERS OF USING SAFETY TO EXPLAIN TRANSMISSION FAILURE: A REPLY TO MARTIN SMITH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

Chris Tucker
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Many epistemologists hold that the Zebra Deduction (the animals are zebras, so they aren't cleverly disguised mules) fails to transmit knowledge to its conclusion, but there is little agreement concerning why it has this defect. A natural idea is, roughly, that it fails to transmit because it fails to improve the safety of its conclusion. In his ‘Transmission Failure Explained’, Martin Smith defends a transmission principle which is supposed to underwrite this natural idea. There are two problems with Smith's account. First, Smith's argument for his transmission principle relies on a dubious premise (§1). Second, even if his transmission principle is true, Smith shows neither that it prevents the Zebra Deduction from transmitting knowledge to its conclusion, nor that it secures the natural idea (§2). I suspect that the failures of Smith's account will be instructive for anyone who wants to connect transmission failure with a failure to enhance the safety, reliability or probability of one's conclusion.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 393 - 406
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Manley, David. 2007. ‘Safety, Apriority, Self-Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 104: 403–23.Google Scholar
Pryor, James. 2004. ‘What's Wrong with Moore's Argument.’ Philosophical Issues, 14: 349–77.Google Scholar
Smith, Martin. 2009. ‘Transmission Failure Explained.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 164–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tucker, Chris. 2010a. ‘When Transmission Fails.’ Philosophical Review, 119: 497–529.Google Scholar
Tucker, Chris. 2010b. ‘Transmission and Transmission Failure in Epistemology.’ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stable URL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/transmis.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 2002. ‘(Anti)-Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar