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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Jonathan Matheson
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Abstract

Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , October 2009 , pp. 269 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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