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CLOSED-MINDEDNESS AND DOGMATISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2018

Heather Battaly
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Abstract

The primary goal of this paper is to propose a working analysis of the disposition of closed-mindedness. I argue that closed-mindedness (CM) is an unwillingness or inability to engage (seriously) with relevant intellectual options. Dogmatism (DG) is one kind of closed-mindedness: it is an unwillingness to engage seriously with relevant alternatives to the beliefs one already holds. I do not assume that the disposition of closed-mindedness is always an intellectual vice; rather I treat the analysis of the disposition, and its status as an intellectual vice, as separate questions. The concluding section develops a framework for determining the conditions under which closed-mindedness will be an intellectual vice.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 15 , Special Issue 3: 2017 Episteme Conference , September 2018 , pp. 261 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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