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The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Gideon Rosen
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Abstract

According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 10 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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