Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T17:24:48.727Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Autonomy of Social Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Michael A. Bishop
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recommend inconsistent beliefs and the belief endorsed by social rationality is true, then that true belief would be an instance of social knowledge but not individual knowledge.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , June 2005 , pp. 65 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ashenfelter, O., Ashmore, D., & Lalonde, R. (1995). Bordeaux Wine Vintage Quality and the Weather. Chance 8: 7–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bealer, G. (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1: 289–365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bishop, M. (2000). In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be? Synthese 122: 179–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bishop, M. & Trout, J.D. (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Carroll, J., Winer, R.Coates, D.Galegher, J., & Alibrio, J. (1988). Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Prediction in Parole Decision-Making. Law and Society Review 17: 199–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L.J. (1981). Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4: 317–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. Journal of Philosophy 76: 256–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R. (1982). The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision- Making In Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, eds. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A., 391–407. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First appeared in (1979) American Psychologist 34: 571-582.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R. (1988). Rational Choice in an Uncertain World. New York: Harcourt.Google Scholar
Dawes, R. & Corrigan, B. (1974) Linear Models in Decision Making. Psychological Bulletin 81: 95–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. (1989). Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment. Science 243: 1668–1674.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Einhorn, H. J. & Hogarth, R.M. (1975). Unit Weighting Schemas for Decision Making. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 13: 172–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faust, D. & Ziskin, J. (1988). The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry. Science 241: 1143–1144.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goldberg, L.R. (1968). Simple Models of Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical Judgments. American Psychologist 23: 483–496.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. & Pust, J. (1994). Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence In Schmitt, F.F. (ed) Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Google Scholar
Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.Google Scholar
Hunter, J.E. & Hunter, R.F. (1984). Validity and utility of alternative predictors of job performance Psychological Bulletin, 96: 72–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1990). The Division of Cognitive Labor. Journal of Philosophy 87: 5–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornblith, H. (1983). Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. The Philosophical Review 92: 33–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kunda, Z. & Nisbett, R.E. (1986). The Psychometrics of Everyday Life. Cognitive Psychology, 18: 195–224.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Leli, D.A. & Filskov, S.B. (1984). Clinical Detection of Intellectual Deterioration Associated With Brain Damage. Journal of Clinical Psychology 40: 1435–1441.3.0.CO;2-0>CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Loomes, G. & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meehl, P. (1986). Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book. Journal of Personality Assessment 50: 370–375.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Passell, P. (1990). Wine Equation Puts Some Noses Out of Joint. The New York Times, March 4: 1.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pust, J. (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. New York: Garland Publishing.Google Scholar
Sawyer, J. (1966). Measurement and Prediction, Clinical and Statistical. Psychological Bulletin 66: 178–200.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schmitt, F. (1994). The Justification of Group Beliefs In Schmitt, F.F. (ed) Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Google Scholar
Solomon, M. (2001). Social Empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spiegel, Alix (2004). Profile: Comparison of human intuition to statistical analysis for predicting future human behavior. All Things Considered. National Public Radio, 5 January 2004. Broadcast.Google Scholar
Stillwell, W., Barron, F., & Edwards, W. (1983). Evaluating Credit Applications: A Validation of Multiattribute Utility Weight Elicitation Techniques. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 32: 87–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedding, D. (1983). Clinical and Statistical Prediction in Neuropsychology. Clinical Neuropsychology 5: 49–55.Google Scholar
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2001) Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1 and 2): 429–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar