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Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2020

Tsung-Hsing Ho Open the ORCID record for Tsung-Hsing Ho [Opens in a new window]
Tsung-Hsing Ho*
Affiliation:
National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Selim Berker argues (1) that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and (2) that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. (1) is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.

Keywords

Epistemic consequentialisminstrumentalismteleologyjustification
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 220 - 230
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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