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ACCURACY FOR BELIEVERS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2017

Julia Staffel
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Abstract

In Accuracy and the Laws of Credence Richard Pettigrew assumes a particular view of belief, which states that people don't have any other doxastic states besides credences. This is in tension with the popular position that people have both credences and outright beliefs. Pettigrew claims that such a dual view of belief is incompatible with the accuracy-first approach. I argue in this paper that it is not. This is good news for Pettigrew, since it broadens the appeal of his framework.

Type
Symposium: Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Information
Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 39 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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