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Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

David Coady
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Abstract

I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 101 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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