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Testimony and A Priori Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Albert Casullo
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Abstract

Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory on the scope of a priori knowledge.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 2007 , pp. 322 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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