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Suspension as Spandrel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2019

Ernest Sosa
Ernest Sosa*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

A telic virtue epistemology was presupposed in our treatment of insight and understanding. What follows will lay out the main elements of that telic theory and explore how it provides an epistemology of suspension.

Keywords

Virtue epistemologysuspensiontelic normativityknowledgeaptness
Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Special Issue 4: 2018 Episteme Conference in Honor of Ernest Sosa , December 2019 , pp. 357 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

Friedman, J. (2017). ‘Why Suspend Judging?’ Noûs 51, 302–26.Google Scholar
Friedman, J. (2019). ‘Inquiry and Belief.’ Noûs 53, 296–315.Google Scholar
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar