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SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2014

Seamus Bradley  and
Katie Steele
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Abstract

There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 277 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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