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A RELIABILISM BUILT ON COGNITIVE CONVERGENCE: AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED SOLUTION TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2013

Martin L. Jönsson
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Abstract

Process-reliabilist analyses of justification and knowledge face the generality problem. Recent discussion of this problem turns on certain untested empirical assumptions that this paper investigates. Three experiments are reported: two are free-naming studies that support the existence of a basic level in the previously unexplored domain of names for belief-forming processes; the third demonstrates that reliability judgments for the basic-level belief-forming process types are very strongly correlated with the corresponding justification and knowledge judgments. I argue that these results lend support to process-reliabilism; I then go on to explore several different ways to make use of them in solutions to the generality problem.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 241 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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