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Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 August 2019

Giada Fratantonio
Giada Fratantonio*
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki, Finland
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard's own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard's response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.

Keywords

Epistemological DisjunctivismAccess ProblemExternalism/InternalismEpistemic Closure PrincipleReflective AccessMcKinsey-paradox
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 555 - 575
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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