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Powerlessness and Social Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Miranda Fricker
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Abstract

Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 3 , Issue 1-2 , June 2006 , pp. 96 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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References

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