Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T04:06:14.729Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ON A NO DEFEAT EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE OF TAL AND COMESAÑA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2018

Randall G. Mccutcheon
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We offer a critical evaluation of a recent proposal of E. Tal and J. Comesaña on the topic of when evidence of evidence constitutes evidence. After establishing that attempts of L. Moretti and W. Roche to discredit the proposal miss their mark, we fashion another, which does not.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 237 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Feldman, R. 2014. ‘Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.’ In Matheson, J. and Vitz, R. (eds), The Ethics of Belief, pp. 284–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fitelson, B. 2012. ‘Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence.’ Analysis, 72: 85–8.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. 1965. The Logic of Decision. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Moretti, L. 2016. ‘Tal and Comesaña on Evidence of Evidence.’ The Reasoner, 10: 38–9.Google Scholar
Roche, W. 2014. ‘Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence under Screening-Off.’ Episteme, 11: 119–24.Google Scholar
Roche, W. 2018. ‘Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off vs. No-Defeaters.’ Episteme. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Tal, E. and Comesaña, J. 2017. ‘Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?’ Nous, 51: 95–112.Google Scholar