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LAWS OF CREDENCE AND LAWS OF CHOICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2017

Sophie Horowitz
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Abstract

In Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Richard Pettigrew gives several decision-theoretic arguments for formal requirements on rational credence. Pettigrew's arguments build on a central notion of epistemic value, but employ different decision rules. These comments explore how our choice of decision rule might matter, and discuss one of Pettigrew's arguments in detail: his argument for the Principle of Indifference, which relies on Maximin.

Type
Symposium: Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Information
Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 31 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

REFERENCES

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