Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T02:17:33.720Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How Intellectual Communities Progress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 February 2020

Lewis D. Ross Open the ORCID record for Lewis D. Ross [Opens in a new window]
Lewis D. Ross*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics, London, UK
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge – for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.

Keywords

Philosophical progressscientific progresssocial epistemologyinquiryinterrogative attitudes
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 738 - 756
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bird, A. (2007). ‘What is Scientific Progress?’ Noûs 41(1), 64–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, A. (2010a). ‘Social Knowing: The Social Sense of ‘Scientific Knowledge’.’ Philosophical Perspectives 24(1), 23–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, A. (2010b). ‘The Epistemology of Science – A Bird's-eye View.’ Synthese 175(1), 5–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, J. (2018). Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D.J. (2015). ‘Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy?’ Philosophy 90(1), 3–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cross, C. and Roelofsen, F. (2018). ‘Questions.’ In Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/questions/.Google Scholar
Dellsén, F. (2016). ‘Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56, 72–83.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dellsén, F. (2017). ‘Understanding Without Justification or Belief.’ Ratio 30(3), 239–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietrich, E. (2011). ‘There Is No Progress in Philosophy.’ Essays in Philosophy 12(2), 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietrich, F. (Forthcoming). ‘A Theory of Bayesian Groups.’ Noûs.Google Scholar
Drake, S. (1978). Galileo at Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Reprinted Dover Publications, New York, 1996.Google Scholar
Elgin, C.Z. (2004). ‘True Enough.’ Philosophical Issues 14(1), 113–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elgin, C.Z. (2017). True Enough. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, J. (2013a). ‘Question-directed Attitudes.’ Philosophical Perspectives 27(1), 145–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, J. (2013b). ‘Suspended Judgment.’ Philosophical Studies 162(2), 165–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, J. (2017). Why Suspend Judging? Noûs 51(2), 302–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, J. (Forthcoming). ‘Inquiry and Belief.’ Noûs.Google Scholar
Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Gutting, G. (2016). ‘Philosophical Progress.’ In Cappelen, H., Gendler, T.S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, pp. 309–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hills, A. (2017). ‘Understanding Why.’ Noûs 49(2), 661–88.Google Scholar
Horwich, P. (2012). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. (2017). ‘Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding.’ In Grimm, S., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds), Explaining Understanding, pp. 251–71. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. (2014). ‘Socially Extended Knowledge.’ Philosophical Issues 24(1), 282–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D.K. (1988a). ‘Statements Partly about Observation.’ Philosophical Papers 17(1), 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D.K. (1988b). ‘Relevant Implication.’ Theoria 54(3), 161–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, C. & Pettit, P. (2011). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moss, S. (2013). ‘Epistemology Formalized.’ Philosophical Review 122(1), 1–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moss, S. (2016). Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Niiniluoto, I. (2014). ‘Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46, 73–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pavese, C. (2017). ‘Know-How and Gradability.’ Philosophical Review 126(3), 345–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quinton, A. (1976). ‘Social Objects.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76, 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Ridder, J. (2014). ‘Epistemic Dependence and Collective Scientific Knowledge.’ Synthese 191(1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rolin, K. (2008). ‘Science as Collective Knowledge.’ Cognitive Systems Research 9(1–2), 115–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ross, L.D. (2018). ‘Is Understanding Reducible?’ Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowbottom, D.P. (2008). ‘N-rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39(2), 277–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowbottom, D.P. (2010). ‘What Scientific Progress is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View.’ International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24(3), 241–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, J.S., Hawthorne, J. and Buchak, L. (2015). ‘Groupthink.’ Philosophical Studies 172(5), 1287–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slezak, P.P. (2018). ‘Is there Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously.’ Philosophy 93(4), 529–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sliwa, P. (2017). ‘Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.’ Ethics 127(3), 521–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stoljar, D. (2017). Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tebben, N. (2019). ‘Knowledge Requires Commitment (Instead of Belief).’ Philosophical Studies 176(2), 321–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. (2004). ‘Freedom to Break the Laws.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28, 332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wray, K.B. (2001). ‘Collective Belief and Acceptance.’ Synthese 129(3), 319–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wray, K.B. (2007). ‘Who has Scientific Knowledge?’ Social Epistemology 21(3), 337–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (2014). Aboutness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar