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HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2012

Allan Hazlett
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Abstract

This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 205 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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