Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T06:28:22.726Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Group Justification in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Kristina Rolin
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , October 2010 , pp. 215 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Beatty, John. 2006. “Masking Disagreement among Experts.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 3(1–2): 52–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bouvier, Alban. 2004. “Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Science and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34(3): 382–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fallis, Don. 2005. “Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 39–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fallis, Don. 2007. “Collective Epistemic Goals.” Social Epistemology 21(3): 267–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 1992. On Social Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 1996. Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 2000a. “Collective Belief and Scientific Change.” In Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays on Plural Subject Theory, pp. 37–49. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 2000b. “Social Rules: Some Problems with Hart's Account, and an Alternative Proposal.” In Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays on Plural Subject Theory, pp. 71–96. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 2002. “Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups.” Protosociology 16: 35–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret. 2004. “Collective Epistemology.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 1(2): 95–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004. “Group Knowledge versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 1(1): 11–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hakli, Raul. 2007. “On the Possibility of Group Knowledge without Belief.” Social Epistemology 21(3): 249–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, Philip. 2001. Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kusch, Martin. 2002. Knowledge by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, Christian. 2005. “Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 25–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mathiesen, Kay. 2006. “The Epistemic Features of Group Belief.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(3): 161–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mathiesen, Kay. 2007. “Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on ‘Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers.’” Social Epistemology 21(3): 209–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettit, Philip. 2003. “Groups with Minds of Their Own.” In Schmitt, F. F. (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, pp. 167–93. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Rehg, William and Kent, W. Staley. 2008. “The CDF Collaboration and Argumentation Theory: The Role of Process in Objective Knowledge.” Perspectives on Science 16(1): 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rolin, Kristina. 2008. “Science as Collective Knowledge.” Cognitive Systems Research 9(1–2): 115–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schickore, Jutta. 2008. “Doing Science, Writing Science.” Philosophy of Science 75(3): 323–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmitt, Frederick F. 1994. “The Justification of Group Beliefs.” In Schmitt, F. F. (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, pp. 257–87. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Solomon, Miriam. 2001. Social Empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staley, Kent W. 2007. “Evidential Collaborations: Epistemic and Pragmatic Considerations in ‘Group Belief.’” Social Epistemology 21(3): 321–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thagard, Paul. 1999. How Scientists Explain Disease. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tollefsen, Deborah P. 2003. “Rejecting Rejectionism.” Protosociology 18–19: 389–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tuomela, Raimo. 2004. “Group Knowledge Analyzed.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 1(2): 109–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wray, K. Brad. 2001. “Collective Belief and Acceptance.” Synthese 129: 319–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wray, K. Brad. 2006. “Scientific Authorship in the Age of Collaborative Research.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37: 505–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wray, K. Brad. 2007. “Who Has Scientific Knowledge?” Social Epistemology 21(3): 337–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar